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Abstract 
The research question that this article attempts to address is: what are the main policy paradigms that guide 
the opinion leaders throughout energy security matters within protracted conflict environments? Using the 
de facto divided island of Cyprus as our single case study, we will deliberately follow grounded theory in 
order to create conceptual definitions out of rudimentary “working ideas” that involve “protracted conflict 
environment”, “energy security” and stakes in “decision making”. This research enterprise involves open-
ended interviews with the opinion-makers on the Island and “political discourse analysis” that identifies the 
quintessential aspects of the recently emerged energy debate. Drawing upon the work of Correlje and van 
der Linde (2006), we highlight two main paradigms: “markets and institutions” and “regions and empire”. In 
the first one, the business logic prevails upon political expediencies and geopolitical calculations, while in 
the second one, national and security concerns outweigh the business logic and the potential international 
economic integration. Through their interaction, we seek to explore how they drive the debate on energy 
security within the realm of a conflict environment.  
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Introduction 
Since the 1960s, after it gained its independence from Great Britain, Cyprus has become the battleground 
between Cypriots of Greek and Turkish origin. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Nicosia still remains the last 
divided capital in the world, by a green line between the Greek-Cypriot administered Republic of Cyprus 
(RoC)1 in the south and the self-declared “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” in the north, excluding the 
British sovereign bases in Akrotiri and Dhekelia2. The leaders of the two sides, along with a host of interna-
tional officials, have unsuccessfully negotiated, so far, the termination of a 43-years partition, involving an 
array of issues like property, governance, economy, territory and security guarantees. Both leaders have 
seemingly agreed to omit any substantive discussion of a particularly thorny issue  the gas reserves that 
were recently detected off the southern side of the Island. It is argued that a potential energy boom around 
Cyprus could spur on a deal between the historic competitors. Nevertheless, this has not been the case; so 
far, at least.  
The author intends to highlight the main arguments that the opinion-makers in Cyprus have “injected” into 
the ongoing energy debate on the Island. What are the main stakes they attach to the future monetization of 
the gas reserves? Which factors encourage the cooperation between the competing sides and which ones 
sustain the current impasse? The research question he seeks to address is: what are the main policy-
paradigms that guide the opinion-leaders throughout energy security matters within protracted conflict envi-
ronments? Using Cyprus as our single case study, we will deliberately follow an inductively oriented ap-
proach in order to establish conceptual definitions out of rudimentary “working ideas” like “energy security” 
and “factors in decision-making”.  
                                                   
1 Whose authority is recognized by the UN for the entire island. 
2 Recognized only by Turkey. 
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To this effect, the paper is divided into three distinct sections: the theoretical, the ontological and the meth-
odological. The first is further segmented into three parts. In the first part the author touches upon the con-
cept of “policy-paradigm” in order to theoretically reflect on the driving forces that motivate or inspire the 
policy-makers and opinion leaders to cope with a problem in one way or another. In the second part he de-
lineates the notion of energy security and forges theoretical linkages between the concepts of policy para-
digm and energy security. The author uses the work of Correlje and van der Linde (2006), which succinctly 
depicts this interplay via the presentation of two contrasting storylines: “markets and institutions” and “re-
gions and empire”. For the needs of this article, the two storylines are identified as the contrasting policy-
paradigms on energy security. Through their interaction, we seek to explore how these ideational stimulants 
prompt the debate on energy security within the realm of a conflict environment.  
In the second section, he outlines the ontological considerations attached to this topic. The author, first, ex-
poses the historical particularities of the protracted Cyprus question. In the second part, he narrates how the 
seeds of the energy debate were sown and describes the role of gas in global politics in general. He then 
drags the discussion into the existing regional realities. What is the amount of the proven and estimated gas 
reserves in the region? How have the delimitation zones in the Eastern Mediterranean been formulated? On 
which grounds are Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots disputing the legal status quo? Which companies have 
been involved in the extraction and production of these reserves so far?  
The author then moves to the methodological section that aims at exploring which discourses, under the 
umbrella of the one or the other policy-paradigm, fuel the energy discussion on the Island. He uses grounded 
theory and qualitative interviewing in order to generate data by collecting the opinions of grassroots’ aca-
demics, energy businessmen, policy-makers and policy advisors. In doing so, he engages in what is known as 
“political discourse analysis” to identify the quintessential aspects of the political discourses attached to the 
two paradigms. Finally, he analyzes the results and conclusions from this categorization.  
Theoretical section 
Policy paradigm 
From a constructivist point of view, in order to perceive and simplify complex realities, every policy-maker 
resorts to his own “cognitive map” of politics. A good understanding of the actor’s beliefs facilitates the 
researcher in his attempt to clarify the general criteria, the stakes that leaders set out in order to assess the 
arising political opportunities within such conflict environments, to estimate the costs and risks associated 
with them and to make utility calculations. 
For the sake of their calculations, policy-makers may use encoded experience. The goals that they pursue at 
any moment in time, are influenced by “policy legacies” or “meaningful reactions to previous policies”, 
conflicts and crises (Weir and Skocpol, 1985). Due to the lessons deduced from these experiences, they 
cultivate a “policy learning process” which deliberately endeavors to “adjust the goals or techniques of poli-
cy in the light of past experience and new information” (Hall, 1990: 7). The ‘learning processes’ drive them 
to customarily operate within a context of ideas and standards which specify not only the objectives of their 
policy reactions towards problems, but also the very notion of the problem they are assigned to tackle 
(Karakasis, 2013: 227). This system of ideas facilitates the implementation of the policy making process, not 
just by serving as road map, but by providing discourse schemas that actors adopt in order to make their own 
road maps comprehensive, convincing and legitimate to their constituents (Campbell, 1998: 381).  
Peter Hall (1990) has named this very system as “policy paradigm”. It implies a set of cognitive and moral 
maps that orients an actor within a policy sphere and functions as a tool for the actors involved in policy 
making to identify problems, specify and prioritize their interests and goals (Bleich, 2002).  
Considering the ambiguity about the energy security debate on the Island, a better appreciation of policy 
paradigms is anticipated to more adequately explain the stakes behind the energy security discourses.  
Energy security and policy paradigm 
Energy security has appeared as a straightforward concept in global politics: “the uninterrupted availability 
of energy sources at an affordable price” (IEA). However, history has shown that conceptions of energy 
security might vary in national styles, geology, geography, and time (Sovacool and Brown, 2010: 80). The 
modern version of energy as a security concern firstly emerged on the radar in the dawn of the nineteenth 
century, when the “mechanization of warfare accelerated the energy requirements for coal-powered war-
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ships and vehicles (ibid).” For most of the 20th century, these concerns, as manifested through two world 
wars, were almost exclusively associated with oil and coal supply (Yergin, 2009: 773). In the 70s’ these 
concerns had reached their peak when Western society, almost in its entirety, struggled to overcome the 
economically disastrous implications of the 1973-74 and 1979-80 oil crises.  
At the start of the 21st century, widespread concerns are expressed again about the security of oil and gas supply. 
Multiple factors opened the Pandora box of the European anxieties with respect to its energy supplies: the insta-
bility in some oil-exporting states as the turmoil of Arab Spring swept over much of North Africa and part of the 
Middle East in 2011 and 2012; the rise of jihadist terrorism in the same region; additionally, the revival of re-
source-nationalism and geopolitical rivalries-manifested through the three Ukrainian crises (2006, 2009, 
2014) and the subsequent cut-off of Russian gas supplies to Europe (Yergin, 2012: 267). 
Nevertheless, the ambiguous term of energy security entails something more than countering the wide varie-
ty of threats. It mirrors the relations among nations, the modality of their interaction, and the impact of ener-
gy on their overall national security. A country’s ability to access energy supplies and the ways in which it 
uses energy, determine, to a great extent, the state of its national security (Shaffer, 2009). Thus, it is im-
portant to examine the interaction between politics and energy. 
Forging theoretical linkages between energy security and policy paradigm 
The paper draws on the work of Correlje and van der Linde (2006) because it concisely illustrates the inter-
dependence of politics and energy through the presentation of two storylines: “markets and institutions” and 
“regions and empire”.  
In the first storyline, inspired by the premises of the neoliberal economic system (Winrow, 2016: 434), the 
writers describe a continuous cooperation in international political and economic institutions, supporting, as 
well, a constant development of the multilateral system that governs international relations (Correlje and van 
der Linde, 2006: 533). Throughout these lines, the energy companies are motivated by expectations of prof-
it, whilst the business logic prevails upon states’ political expediencies and geopolitical calculations.  
The other storyline, dominated by a neorealist perspective, signals the break-up of the international system 
into competing blocks, which may engage in rivalry over the control of energy resources and markets (ibid: 
536; Winrow, 2016: 434). In this context, neorealist views gain prominence. It includes, essentially, a divi-
sion of the global economic system into countries and regions, on the basis of ideology, religion and 
(geo)political arguments (ibid: 536) and domestic calculations. National and security concerns or conflicts 
outweigh the business logic and the potential international economic integration. Energy companies  re-
strained by the rationale followed in these regions  have to pay attention to the national security perspec-
tives of the actors involved. 
How these storylines are manifested in the energy debate on the Island is at stake in this paper. We assume 
that both rationales inspire the opinion-leaders in the formulation of their energy security strategy. This begs 
the question of how they actually communicate them. Caroline Kuzemko (2014) embarked upon a similar 
initiative in her endeavor to highlight the role of ideas as key explanatory variables in the power relations 
between EU and Russia on energy security matters. She identified the ability of ideas to be influential in 
energy policy while setting forth which ideas become relevant through their interaction with concepts of 
power, legitimacy and identity (ibid).  
The above narrated storylines inform us on the rationale guiding the opinion-leaders in setting forth their 
policy suggestions. They identify the stakes and considerations that the opinion-leaders inject into their en-
ergy security discourses. That is why, for the sake of this paper, the author identifies these storylines as the 
contrasting policy paradigms. It is illuminating to figure out how they actually unfold within a framework 
characterized by the legacies of conflict, mutual distrust and antagonism.  
Ontological considerations 
Geographical and historical background of the conflict 
Being situated in the Eastern Basin of the Mediterranean Sea, the island of Cyprus possesses a central posi-
tion in the global politics due to its location at the juncture of Eurasia with Africa.  Cyprus has historically 
witnessed the invasion, the establishment and the interaction of all the ancient civilizations of pre-history 
and proto-history projecting it into a “crossroad of civilizations”. Hellenic tribes (Arcadians, Achaeans and 
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Mycenaeans, the Ptolemy dynasty)  settled in Cyprus contributing to the formulation of the Hellenic char-
acter of the Island. During Eastern Romans’ era, the Christian Orthodox character of its spiritual and cultural 
identity was molded3. Between 1571 and 1878 the Ottoman Empire ruled over Cyprus, playing a catalytic 
role in forging the Turkish Cypriot identity of some of its constituents. 
In 1878, at the culmination of the Great Eastern Crisis and in fear of an eventual Russian expansion into its 
territories, the Ottoman rule over Cyprus substantially ended. Sultan Abdul Hamit II ceded the administra-
tion of the Island to the British authorities in exchange for formal guarantees to protect the integrity of the 
Ottoman borders from Russian expansionist aspirations. Even from the first year of the British occupation, 
various discontents awakened “philhellenic aspirations” in certain urban circles. The claim for “enosis” was 
fundamentally considered as an extension of the 19th century Greek irredentist nationalism and “subsequent 
struggles to incorporate Greek speaking regions of the old Ottoman Empire into the Modern Greek state” 
(Stavrou, 2009: 7). On the other side, the Turkish Cypriots considered the Island part of the Ottoman territory.  
In 1914, at the outbreak of WWI and after the Ottomans’ decision to align their forces with the opponents  
the Central Powers  of the Entente, the British annexed the territory de jure. Greek Cypriots envisaged in this 
evolution the avenues for the realization of their “enosis” aspirations. In 1931 these aspirations boiled over 
with a spontaneous rebellion against the British rule, leaving Government House in flames (Anderson, 2008). 
As a response, the British administration suspended the colony’s Constitution and decreed any agitations relat-
ed to “enosis” punishable (ibid). In 1950 the Church mobilized mass popular support for “enosis” by conduct-
ing a ‘plebiscite’. 96% of the participants supported the union with Greece. On the other side, Turkish Cypri-
ots, who had already formulated KATAK4 in 1943, organized demonstrations against these aspirations (In-
terview with Kizilyurek on 20.11.2014). They came to embrace partition, “taksim”, as the main goal of the 
Turkish Cypriot nationalism in order to counterbalance the Greek-Cypriot claim for “enosis”.  
Greece’s initiatives to project the Cyprus issue into the agenda of the 9th session of the General Assembly in 
the UN (1954-1955) fell short of its objective to mobilize international support for the “enosis” cause. Great 
Britain unveiled its concerns that a potential internationalization of the issue by the Greeks, without first 
informing the Turkish government, would flare up the Turkey’s fears that Greece was setting up a territorial 
claim on the Island. The British attitude provoked, thus, the first Turkish involvement in the Cypriot state of 
affairs after 1878 and revitalized the Turkish Cypriot nationalistic sentiments for “taksim”.  
In 1955, after the failure of protracted negotiations between the Island’s new governor, Field Marshal Sir 
John Harding and Archbishop Makarios III, an outbreak of anti-British military activities by  EOKA’ 5 took 
place (Spyridakis, 1974: 177). The British undertook an intensive campaign to exterminate EOKA and Ma-
karios was exiled to The Seychelles a year later. Evoking the explosive situation in the Island, Great Britain 
initiated a Tripartite Conference (Greece, Turkey, UK) in London to determine the Island’s political future 
but no solution was reached. It remained, however, significant since, on the one hand, it officially marked 
the beginning of the active participation of Turkey in the Cyprus question and, on the other, the minority 
status of the Turkish Cypriots got upgraded into a community status (Blay, 1981: 80). These two agreements 
created a “free state” − whose territorial integrity was guaranteed by the UK, Greece and Turkey, “but not a 
nation” of Cyprus (Spyridakis, 1974: 184). 
After intense haggling and negotiations, a series of international agreements  concluded in Zurich and 
London in 1959 and 1960  gave birth to the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). It was conceived as a bi-communal 
state where power would be shared between its two constituent communities: the Greek-Cypriots and the 
Turkish-Cypriots. Its territorial integrity would be guaranteed by three guarantor powers: Greece, Turkey 
and Great Britain. In its very infancy, the newly-founded state was not the beloved child of its inhabitants 
since it cropped up as the accidental offspring of violent conflicts during the 1950s. The multiple checks and 
balances included within these accords, inhibited the functional operation of the Constitution. The amend-
ments submitted by the restored President Archbishop Makarios III in 1963 encountered Turkish and Turk-
ish-Cypriot rejection resulting in a constitutional deadlock accompanied by violent clashes between the two 
communities. British troops intervened by establishing the buffer zone marked by a ‘green line’ between the 
                                                   
3 The establishment of the Apostolic Church of Cyprus by Saint Paul and Saint Barnabas had already taken place in 46 AD. 
4 Kıbrıs Adası; Türk Azınlık Kurumu. The Association of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus. 
5 On the 1st of April 1955 EOKA – a Greek acronymic meaning for “National Organization of Cypriot Fighters”  under the leader-
ship of the retired Colonel George Grivas, declared that the Cyprus revolution had begun. 
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two camps, and thereby paving the way for the UN peacekeeping mission in 1964 and for Secretary Gen-
eral’s (SG) “good offices6. 
The political turmoil in Greece – culminating in the establishment of the military regime in 1967 – and the 
inter-communal tensions in November 1967 (bombing of villages and forces by both sides) brought the ne-
gotiations to an impasse. In May 1968 the dialogue was resumed for almost six years, but terminated in the 
summer of 1974. A coup d’état against Macharios III, engineered by the then Greek military dictatorship, 
was followed by Turkey’ military invasion, which altered the demographic structure of the RoC and resulted 
in a massive social dislocation of both Greek – and Turkish Cypriots. Turkish forces occupied 37% of the 
Island and since then have kept around 35,000 troops on it. Turkish officials justified their military interven-
tion (which they have called a “peace operation”) upon security considerations and started bringing settlers 
from the Turkish mainland to the Island in order to bolster the population of the north. In the light of these 
events, the Security Council (SC) passed several resolutions calling unsuccessfully for a ceasefire, an imme-
diate termination of the foreign military intervention and the withdrawal of all the forces except for those, 
whose presence was authorized by the accords.  
Nevertheless, after the de facto division, a parallel administration, which the Turkish Cypriots had been 
running in the decade 1964-1974 evolved into a “self-governing” status in the north. SG Waldheim re-
launched the framework of good offices in order to overcome the impasse. The idea of a bi-zonal bi-
communal federation, as the outcome of the Denktash-Makarios’ communal talks, has been accepted as the 
blueprint for a solution since 1977. Nonetheless, successive leaders have not shared a common view of the 
legal and political consequences that this very solution implies. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared their 
independence, a development that the SC has condemned via successive resolutions. Despite the innumera-
ble UN mediations, the efforts of the international community to bring about a solution have proved ineffec-
tual. The last integrated international effort through the UN sponsored Annan Plan, was rejected by the 
Greek-Cypriots after having been put to a referendum in 2004. The RoC got admitted to the EU in 2004 
without a settlement, making Turkish and Turkish-Cypriots question EU’s reliability as an impartial broker 
in the Cyprus issue. Hence, the negotiations have gone back and forth and have failed, so far, in reaching a 
peaceful settlement.  
How is the situation nowadays? On the south there is the Republic of Cyprus, administered by the Greek-
Cypriots, member of the EU and the UN and, in general, a functioning, prosperous and well-governed dem-
ocratic state with one of the highest levels of GDP per capita. However, their economy tipped into recession 
in 2009 as the ongoing global financial crisis and the resulting low demand hit their main economic pillars, 
the tourism and construction sectors (CIA Factbook). An overextended banking sector with excessive expo-
sure to Greek debt added to the contraction. After numerous downgrades of its credit rating, RoC lost access 
to international capital markets in May 2011. Two months later, the situation deteriorated when containers 
of explosives, stored for some years in a naval base self-detonated and killed 13 people, injured 62 and dam-
aged the Island’s largest power station designed to supply over half of Cyprus’ electricity (Athanasiou, on 
11.7.2011).  
In July 2012, RoC became the fifth euro-zone government to request an economic bailout program from the 
“Troika”7. There is the self-styled “TRNC”, not recognized by any state of the international community 
(except for Turkey) – as the outcome of consecutive SC resolutions – that deals with an embargo put on its 
ports and relies heavily on Turkish military and economic support. Its economy is dominated by the services 
sector, which includes the public sector, trade, tourism, and education (ibid). 
In the paragraphs above we delineated the historical background of the conflict by setting forth those events 
that have consolidated the de facto division on the island and the protracted character of the conflict. Within 
this context, we will lay out the opening of a new chapter, which is the energy debate. 
                                                   
6 That is an old diplomatic institution  facilitating dialogue between the disputants. 
7 Composed of the European Commission, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. After the election of Presi-
dent Nikos Anastasiades in February 2013, Cyprus reached an agreement with the Troika on a bailout that resulted in losses on 
uninsured bank deposits triggering a two-week bank closure and the imposition of capital controls that remained partially in place 
until April 2015 (CIA Factbook). 
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The ontological framework of the energy debate around the Island: exploratory, legal and economic 
parameters 
We will concentrate now on the recent gas developments around the Island. The author, herewith, shortly 
presents the role of natural gas (NG) in global politics and narrows the discussion down to the gas develop-
ments in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
The 1973 Arab oil embargo amplified the impetus for the increasing role of gas in the energy supply. The 
shortages and spiking prices as the outcome of the embargo encouraged many countries to diversify away 
from the Middle East oil and shifted gas from a cluster of regional markets into a global marketplace (Barne 
et al 2006: 8), although it cannot be considered as a global commodity in its own right. NG is produced, 
transported, and traded through regional, fragmented markets (Saz Carranza & Vandendriessche, 2015). It is 
difficult to transport it and requires a network to be delivered (through a pipeline or a regasification plant). It 
relies on a system of logistics and transportation which is fixed and much less flexible than the existing ones 
for oil. Furthermore, the majority of NG pricing worldwide is long term and linked to oil prices. These long-
term, oil indexed contracts, which typically include take-or-pay clauses8 provide a boost to immature mar-
kets, because their reliability safeguards the infrastructure investments required for NG trade (ibid.). 
These properties make NG inherently geopolitical.  The above described infrastructure is extremely costly to 
build and conditioned upon long-run horizons as well as a predictable geopolitical and economic context 
that will enable investors to “sink their capital and knowledge” (Barnes et al., 2006: 3). Due to the state-
regulated sphere, within which the gas market is operating, governments, by contrast with the oil market, are 
urged to play a larger role in the NG trade. Thus, states, in choosing routes to export their commodities and 
import their energy supplies, naturally consider and promote the political ramifications of various route op-
tions (ibid). 
The way this has been displayed around Cyprus will be explained in the following section. 
The case in the Eastern Mediterranean: exploratory, legal and economic context 
Much of the hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean have gone undiscovered because the resources lie in 
the seabed under very deep waters. These depths exceed two km in some locations and made drilling in the 
area a difficult, risky and expensive business. At the dawn of the 21st century, recent technological advanc-
es, accompanied by high international oil prices, prompted new exploration initiatives. The rapid advances 
in micro-processing made the analysis of vastly more data possible and facilitated geophysicists in greatly 
improving their interpretation of underground structures and, consequently, exploration success (Yergin, 
2011: 40). These technological advances had an enormous impact on the energy developments around Cy-
prus as well. In March 2010, the U.S Geological Survey estimated a mean of 122 trillion cubic feet of re-
coverable gas in the seabed of Levant Basin Province, located along and off the coast of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, 
and the Gaza Strip, extending westward into Cypriot waters (see Figure 1. Levant Basin: Oil & gas finds).  
 
Figure 1. Levant Basin: Oil & gas finds 
Source: Noble Energy. 
                                                   
8 Which means specifying a minimum, pre-set volume of gas per year that the buyer will pay for at the contract price, regardless of 
whether the volume is consumed or not 
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After having proclaimed its EEZ and signed delimitation agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) 
and Israel (2010), RoC demarcated the outer limits of a 51 km2 exploration area and carved it into 13 blocks 
(see Figure 2). The agreement with Israel marked the beginning of an increasing collaboration between the 
two, an initiative joined by Greece as well. The Israeli and Greek Navies joined forces conducting joint-
drills in the region. This trilateral collaboration was given an extra impetus after the Gaza flotilla raid inci-
dent in May 2010 and the deterioration of the relations between Israel and Turkey9. Collaborations of a simi-
lar nature between Egypt, Cyprus and Greece were also noticeable during that period. 
Since 2008, the government of RoC had already awarded one license to the small-sized Noble Energy, 
which had been operating offshore Israel. After multiple seismic surveys of Noble, the first exploratory 
drilling unfolded in Block 12 in September 2011. Two months later, the company indicated a 5-8 tcf natural 
gas deposit in deep waters. This discovery, albeit of small importance, triggered a significant interest in a 
second offshore licensing round in February 2012 with the participation of 15 bidders, including bigger in-
ternational oil companies and gas traders. The Italian ENI, the French Total and the Korean Kogas were 
accredited with the exploration of six more blocks (2, 3, 9, 6, 8, 11). In December 2016 a third licensing 
round took place and a consortium between the American giant Exxon Mobil and Qatar Petroleum won the 
bid to launch drilling in one more block 10. 
 
Figure 2. 13 blocks as divided by RoC 
Source: Offshore Energy Today. 
Turkey, one of the guarantor powers on the Island, fiercely objected to all actions taken by the RoC with 
regard to its EEZ claims and offshore hydrocarbons development (Gurel & Le Cornu, 2014: 18). Turkish 
and Turkish Cypriot officials argued that any unilateral Greek Cypriot action in this field, before a settle-
ment is reached, would not only ignore the legitimate rights of Turkish Cypriots, but would establish a fait 
accompli prejudicing the terms of a prospective arrangement on sovereignty issues to the disadvantage of 
the Turkish Cypriots. On 21 September 2011 and as a reaction to the launch of the exploratory drilling by 
the RoC government, the Turkish Cypriots signed a continental shelf delimitation agreement with Turkey. 
The contributing parts drew a boundary line between the northern coast of Cyprus and the southern coast of 
Turkey in the Mediterranean Sea. In doing so, Turkish Cypriots and Turks dispatched a seismic vessel, Piri 
Reis, and issued licenses to TPAO to conduct a three-dimensional seismic research along with onshore and 
offshore drillings around the recently traced maritime borders between them. A couple of years later, in 
October 2014, a Turkish navigational warning notified mariners that Turkey would soon repeat its seismic 
surveys in sea areas encroaching on Cyprus’s EEZ. This action urged the Greek Cypriot leader to pull out of 
the ongoing reunification talks. In the meantime the drilling has been stalled and is expected to re-launch in 
July 2017.  
                                                   
9 The flotilla, organized by the Free Gaza Movement and the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitari-
an Relief (İHH), was carrying humanitarian aid to terminate the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip. Israel reacted through a military 
operation -against six civilian ships of the “Gaza Freedom Flotilla” in international waters of the Mediterranean Sea- during which 
nine activists were killed in one of the six ships: the Mavi Marmara.  
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Having laid out the historical, exploratory, legal, economic and political framework within which the energy 
game unfolds, we will go on with highlighting the stakes that the opinion-leaders attach to it.  
Methodology 
The stakes, as conceptualized in the theoretical framework, are the policy-paradigms. The author wants to 
progressively identify them through the collection of some observations he made when he visited the island 
of Cyprus in 2014 and 2015. This specific type of inductive theorizing that he embarks upon, is grounded 
theory. In line with this rationale, he had to collect data and analyze them simultaneously from the prelimi-
nary stages of his research. Having certain sensitizing concepts in mind (protracted conflict environment, 
energy security, policy paradigm)  he selected a sample of opinion-leaders he deemed useful for his re-
search in order to elicit proper information  and formed preliminary interviewing questions to open up 
these contrasting paradigms (Charmaz, 2011: 2).  
Qualitative interviewing 
In this context, he talked to people coming from the energy business area, to academics with expertise in the 
history of the Cyprus conflict, policy advisors, former accredited negotiators in resolving the conflict, as 
well as former ministers of Foreign Affairs and Energy. These participants were asked to tell their story in 
order to facilitate the construction of the dataset about the above mentioned sensitizing paradigms.  Qualita-
tive interviews provide an open-ended, in depth-exploration of such an aspect about which the interviewees 
hold substantial experience, often accompanied by considerable insights (Chatmaz, 2011: 3). With respect to 
the RoC, and the Turkish-Cypriots, the author interviewed key figures in chronological order, as shown in 
Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. He approached also Dr. Tzimitras, Director of Peace Research Institute 
Olso (PRIO) Cyprus Centre, who has conducted numerous reports and organized several conferences in the 
Island and abroad around this energy debate (on 22.12.2015). 
Table 1. Interviewees in RoC (in chronological order) 
Name of the interviewee Professional affiliation expertise Date of interview 
Dr. Nikos Moudouros 
Member of the Geostrategic Council of the RoC and adviser to the 
former President of the RoC, Dimitris Christofias (2008-2013) on 
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot issues. 
18.11.2014 
Pr. Andreas Theophanous 
Director of the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs 
and Ex Economic Advisor to Georgios Vasiliou, former President of 
the RoC (September 1990-February 1993). 
19.11.2014 
Dr. Constantinos Adamides 
Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of 
Nicosia, member of the Geostrategic Council of the RoC. 
30.11.2015 
Dr. Zenon 
Associate Lecturer at UCLAN with expertise in Turkish politics and 
foreign policy. 
3.12.2015 
Dr. Charles Ellinas 
CEO of Cyprus-based energy consultancy e-CNHC and former CEO 
for the Cypriot National Hydrocarbon Company (KRETYK) 
4.12.2015 
Nikos Rolandis 
➢ Former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1978-1983) and of 
Commerce, Industry and Tourism in the coalition-government 
formed up by the late President Clerides. 
➢ Pioneer in setting the offshore oil and gas reserves of Cyprus in 
the political agenda. 
11.12.2015 
Table 2. Interviewees in the northern part (in chronological order) 
Name of the interviewee Professional affiliation expertise Date of interview 
Dr. Ayla Gürel Senior Research Consultant of PRIO. 11.11.2014 
Pr. Ahmet Sözen 
Chair of the Department of Political Science and International 
Relations at Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU)  former 
member of the Turkish Cypriot team in the UN-led peace negotiations 
17.11.2014 
Pr. Niyazi Kızılyürek 
Advisor to the RoC President Nicos Anastasiades on Turkish affairs in 
the Geostrategic Advisory Council, and Dean of the Faculty of 
Humanities in the University of Cyprus. 
20.11.2014 
Dr. Hayriye Kahveci Analyst in energy politics. 1.12.2015 
Pr. Kudret Özersay 
former Turkish-Cypriot negotiator and founder of “The People’s 
Party”.  
18.12.2015 
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Rather than asking them contrived questions designed to elicit particular sorts of data, the author asked his 
interviewees “real questions”, which they were genuinely interested to answer. A sample of these questions 
is indicated in Table 3. By the collection of statements-answers to his questions after the transcription, he 
underlined the very parameters involved in the Cypriot energy chessboard. By putting together descriptions from 
separate interviewees, he constructed the policy-paradigms that drive the energy security debate in the context of 
a protracted conflict environment. The modality of this construction is explained in the following part. 
Table 3. Type of questions asked to the interviewees 
Energy security Cyprus conflict Policy paradigm 
How do they define energy security? 
What are the main impediments in 
reaching a settlement and looking at the 
win-win side in exploiting these gas 
reserves? 
Which aspects should the leaders take 
into consideration before making a 
decision on the monetization of gas 
reserves? 
What geopolitical and/or economic 
factors have to be examined? 
What difficulties are inherited by the 
protracted conflict? 
What are the main risks and dangers 
attached to the implementation of every 
decision? 
What is the role of the international 
(UN, USA, Russia, EU) and the regional 
(Israel, Egypt) actors in this respect? 
Which factors make the conflict sustain? 
What kind of priorities should the 
political leaders set before sweeping 
into the formulation of an energy 
security strategy? 
Which alternatives do exist for the 
Greek-Cypriots to export their gas 
reserves? 
How does the one side view the other? 
The energy debate follows a market-
oriented or a geopolitical approach. 
Political discourse analysis 
In order to safeguard that his study will address the quintessentially political aspects of the policy-
paradigms, the author engaged in what Seidel (1985) calls “political discourse analysis”. Discourses refer to 
communication practices that systematically construct our knowledge of reality. The stake here is to make 
out the “truths” on energy security issues as these stem from the transcripts of the interviews and deliberate-
ly insert them in one of the two policy-paradigms. Table 4 depicts the categories of the discourses attached 
to the two contrasting policy paradigms as they cropped up after the collection of the statements.  
Table 4. The contrasting policy paradigms 
“Markets and Institutions” “Regions and Empire” 
Export option to Turkey Energy as a security issue 
 Challenges for gas companies 
Export option to Egypt The Geopolitical Chessboard: 
1. The EEZ and the dispute in the Aegean 
2. The formation of triangles 
3. The role of the big players 
The construction of LNG Peace-negotiations, domestic politics and energy 
Gas for peace The Legacies of the Conflict 
Discourses attached to the “markets and institutions” policy paradigm 
After having conducted the discourse analysis, the author came up with five main discourses: “the export 
option to Turkey”, “the export option to Egypt”, “the construction of LNG”, and “Gas for Peace”.  
Export option to Turkey 
The discourse that was mostly discussed in the interviews is the export option from the Israeli gas field of 
Leviathan to Turkey through Cyprus. Various hypotheses were set forth. The Greek-Cypriot energy affili-
ates and some Turkish-Cypriots portrayed it as the main viable option for the Greek-Cypriots if they want 
their gas to journey to Europe. The primary condition upon which this scenario could play out is the settle-
ment of the Cyprus conflict. Some Turkish-Cypriots claimed that there are “Turkish companies lobbying” to 
construct this pipeline10 and Turkish diplomats were making these plans “without consulting the Turkish 
Cypriots.” The Turkish-Cypriot side remarked that if no settlement is reached, this potential pipeline “might 
                                                   
10 Implying probably Turcas Holding and Zorlu Group. 
SocioEconomic Challenges, Volume 1, Issue 2, 2017   
 14 
not go through the RoC but through Karpaz”, which lies in the Turkish-Cypriot controlled northern side of 
the Island. On the other side, Greek-Cypriots, who ruled out the possibility of the last scenario, indicated the 
problematic repercussions that a pipeline to Turkey would have on the RoC. For them the unilateral depend-
ency on an unpredictable Turkey spotlighted the most serious concern.  
Export to Egypt 
Another discourse relates to the potential export of the gas reserves to Egypt that has two LNG termination 
plants at its disposal (Damietta and Idku). It was stressed though that companies will not invest in this op-
tion till the gas prices go up.  
The construction of an LNG 
The third discourse about this policy paradigm refers to the potential construction of LNG in the port of 
Vassilikos of Limassol. This option, if realized, would provide the Greek-Cypriots with a sense of flexibility 
in their export options. Nevertheless, it was stressed that Greek-Cypriots “under the current prices cannot 
take any advantage of their gas reserves because they lie offshore in ultra-deep waters”.  
Gas for peace 
The last discourse regards the possibilities for energy to facilitate the conditions of a peaceful settlement on 
the Island. An idea set forth by the Greek-Cypriot side was for the Greek Cypriots to keep at the drilling 
activities, but under the supervision of an international authority, within which a Turkish Cypriot representa-
tive could also participate. The Turkish Cypriots would not participate in the management of these reserves 
but they could supervise the whole procedure joining an international banner. This proposal would include a 
disclaimer: whatever is agreed upon, the energy topic would not constitute a precedent for the other items of 
the Cyprus question. The idea for an escrow account was also suggested and espoused by some of the Turk-
ish-Cypriot interviewees on the condition to function as an investment bank. 
As to the question whether the companies could contribute to the application of a neo-functional framework 
in order to enhance the cooperation between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, some of the reactions of 
the Greek-Cypriot interviewees were negative: “no company in the world would invest billions to bring 
about peace”. They claimed that the presence of pipelines is just a reflection of peace or stability, not the 
other way round.  
Discourses attached to the “Regions and Empire” policy paradigm 
The paradigm “regions and empire” synthesizes the interplay among five main discourses: “energy as a security 
issue”, “challenges for gas companies”, “Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean” (divided into three further 
sub-categories), “Peace-negotiations, domestic politics and gas” and “the legacies of the conflict”. 
Energy as a security issue 
Here we place the emphasis on the role of “realpolitik” in the energy security debate. For some of the 
Greek-Cypriot interviewees, the whole stake in the speculations about a pipeline to Turkey is security: 
“opening the door to Turkey signals that the Greek-Cypriots question their sovereignty” even in the after-
math of a settlement. For them, “the national sovereignty of Cyprus should not be in jeopardy. Therefore, 
the Greek- Cypriots should be the ones making the decisions on their own” without the Turkish Cypriots. 
Turkish Cypriots, on their side, recall a resolution issued by the UNGA in 1962, “Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources”, which attributes access rights not only to states, but also to people and nations.” Further-
more, they claim that Greek-Cypriots should not project the energy issue “into the existential question for the 
RoC, as if the RoC’s existence depends on talking about hydrocarbons with Turkish-Cypriots or not.”  
Challenges for the gas companies 
This discourse succinctly explains the rationale as well as the obstacles that the companies have to surmount 
in their decision making on energy issues: waiting for the outcome for the re-unification talks, Turkey’s 
opposition to drillings, difficulties of a bureaucratic character. Nevertheless, companies like TOTAL and 
ENI, for which Cyprus’ entitlement in the region is strong, still keep researching in blocks 11, 2, 3, 9 despite 
Turkey’s pressure. 
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The Geopolitical chessboard 
This discourse entails three sub-categories that are identified here as: “the EEZ and the Aegean dispute11”, 
“the newly emerged triangles” and “the role of the big players”. 
1. The EEZ and the Aegean dispute 
One of the Turkish-Cypriot interviewees laid out the legal parameters of the regional landscape: “There 
are twenty one indigenous states having shores at the Eastern Mediterranean, the majority of which does 
not have an EEZ, due to the nature of the Eastern Mediterranean.” The same person said that when “the 
RoC started to sign the EEZ, there was a giant sleeping for years and the Greek-Cypriots woke him up.” 
In this view, the stake was not only in the Eastern Mediterranean but in the Aegean Sea as well; “it was 
something that would not make Turkey and Greece step back.”  
2. The newly emerged triangles 
Within this discourse the formation of the various cooperation schemas was discussed too. What is the 
nature of the triangles between Israel-Greece-Cyprus and Egypt-Greece-Cyprus? In the Greek-Cypriot 
view, these collaborations are oriented towards the right direction, which is the stability in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The Greek-Cypriots hesitated to call them axes or alliances, although both the public 
and the media utilized these terms to frame the nature and modality of these relationships. The Greek-
Cypriot interviewees notified the author that the Greek-Cypriot lack of experience and expertise “in se-
curing their natural resources through coast-guard, navy and air-force” was the main driving force be-
hind their initiative, given the unstable regional environment. In the Turkish-Cypriot view and due to the 
deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations in the aftermath of the Mavi-Marmara incident, these triangles 
were perceived then in the light of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”.  Furthermore, they ques-
tioned the fundamentals of these triangles by raising the following aphorism: “From the Israeli point of 
view, it is good to have close relations with two EU members, but this does not mean that Israel is going 
to sacrifice its links with Turkey for this relationship”.  
3. The role of the big players 
The role of the big players could not be absent from the discussion. In the point of view of both the 
Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots, “the US in the background have played a very big role in bridg-
ing the gap between the two competitors in order to “create an environment of cooperation” that would 
gradually stabilize the region. For both sides, the Americans want to clear the Cyprus question out of 
their way in order to restore their problematic relations with Turkey back to normality. 
In this connection, Russia’s attitude should not be overlooked. Given the Russians’ ability to dock their ves-
sels in the Greek-Cypriot ports, Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot interviewees agreed that an eventual change of 
the status quo might imperil Russia’s interests there.  
Same applies to the UK. For some of the Turkish-Cypriot respondents, the current status quo does not have 
a “hurting stalemate” effect on the British interests, since it embraces a level of stability, thereby enabling 
the UK to continue to use the sovereign bases, without any dispute. 
Peace-negotiations, domestic politics and energy 
The next discourse is about the role that gas developments have played in the peace-negotiations. One of the 
Greek-Cypriot respondents drew a sharp distinction, claiming that energy might fuel the tensions and create 
a problem in parallel with the Cyprus conflict; hence, it should not be put on the negotiation table. He also 
said that if the cooperation “in the management of these resources were a solely bi-communal issue, a modus 
vivendi could have theoretically been reached”. Nevertheless, the difficulties crop up if the approval of Tur-
key to this is requested, he added. The Turkish Cypriot answer to this remark was that the presumption “that 
the Turkish Cypriots would prevent a decision from being taken, underlines another missing element in the 
Cyprus conflict; that is the federal culture.” 
                                                   
11 Which cannot be analyzed in the current paper. 
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Another Greek-Cypriot respondent expressed a different view: “without a meeting with the Turkish-
Cypriots –not with Turkey- to discuss on the energy issue, the Greek-Cypriots would find themselves under 
the “Damoclean sword” of Turkey.”  
This discourse illustrates the role of domestic politics in both the negotiations process and the energy policy-
making. In the view of some Greek-Cypriots, the countries in the whole Eastern Mediterranean region “ap-
proached the whole energy debate purely from a political point of view, prioritizing it over the business 
logic.” In the words of a Turkish-Cypriot interviewee, “the natural gas has been utilized for domestic con-
sumption and not for real economic purposes.” A Turkish-Cypriot interviewee claimed that the AKEL gov-
ernment initiated the whole endeavor in order to restore its shaken image after the Mari events in 2011 and 
deflect the attention from the economic reforms needed. For the same respondent the 2011 seismic crisis 
was not a Turkish but a Turkish-Cypriot endeavor to drag the Greek-Cypriot exploration activities into a 
reciprocity question. 
Legacies of the conflict 
This leads the author back to the story of the conflict, which constitutes, also, the last discourse-component 
of the “region and empire” policy paradigm. One of the respondents stated that in the case of political-
military conflicts, “energy, as such, has not been, so far, a factor contributive to their resolution” but has 
rather evolved as “an essential chapter of the pre-existing conflict”. In this view, Cyprus could theoretically 
become an exceptional example of energy’s capacity to bring about peace, because “Cypriots deal with a 
manageable-dormant crisis” and “the incentives to resolve it drop day by day”.  
Nevertheless, the answers received from both sides provided a reality check for this assumption. From the 
RoC’s point of view, due to the feelings of abasement Greek-Cypriots experienced in 1974, there is an hon-
est, real and natural fear vis-à-vis Turkey in military terms. Furthermore, they are afraid that Turkish-
Cypriots would be treated as the “Trojan horse” of Turkey. On the other side, the Turkish-Cypriots believe 
that the way Greek-Cypriots envisage to shape the new state, risks becoming second class citizens, deprived 
of any right to intervene. These fears remain intact. One of the Turkish-Cypriot respondents mentioned: 
“Cyprus is a space wherein resentment exists; a space in which people, communities and citizens feel un-
derprivileged and deeply traumatized. Wherever resentment exists, the past never becomes a past.” That is 
why a topic irrelevant to the sources of the Cyprus question – like energy – is viewed by many of the re-
spondents through the lenses of the pre-existing conflict and becomes another chapter of the latter. Fears 
were also expressed – in case of a non-successful conclusion of the ongoing negotiation process – for a po-
tential division, permanent and legitimate.  
Conclusions 
Through what has been recorded in the previous pages, the author sought to establish the parameters that 
formulate the energy debate in relation to the island of Cyprus. To this effect, he used three sensitizing con-
cepts – protracted conflict, energy security and policy paradigm-and collected data out of his interviews with 
policy-makers, analysts, energy affiliates and academics, conducted in 2014 and 2015, for the purpose of 
exploring how they actually work in real-life politics.  He resorted to a bottom-up approach in sorting out 
the statements he deemed useful in his effort to generate certain theories that shed light on the dynamics that 
sustain the debate. This approach helped him to actively listen to the concerns of the respondents and voice 
the stakes that should be taken into consideration.  
He used the notion of “policy-paradigm” coined by Peter Hall in order to conceptualize all these different 
dimensions that loomed up out of the transcriptions of interviews and are attached to the energy security 
debate. Drawing upon the storylines of Correlje and van der Linde (2006), he classified the statements into 
two categories: “markets and institutions” and “regions and empire”. In the first one, inspired by the neolib-
eral paradigm, economic-laden arguments with respect to the monetization of the gas reserves were priori-
tized. The stake here was to touch upon the business logic behind the debate as well as the “spill-over” ef-
fect they might have on a peaceful settlement. Consequently, he put extra emphasis on discourses like “ex-
port option to Turkey”, “export option to Egypt”, “construction of LNG”, and “gas for peace”. Turkey, un-
der the circumstances that existed at that time was portrayed, as being economically, the only viable option 
for the Greek-Cypriots if they wanted their gas to journey to Europe. Politically, however, this option was 
conditioned on the need to discover more gas and, most importantly, on a peaceful settlement of the conflict. 
This led us to the second most prominent discourse on how the neo-functional paradigm could be effective 
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in the very realities of the Cyprus conflict. The idea of establishing a peace-fund that would operate as an 
investment bank in order to improve the infrastructure on the Island was suggested. Furthermore, the low 
gas prices and the small amount of gas reserves detected so far, allegedly do not enable the construction of 
LNG. The export option to Egypt was also suggested, under the condition that the latter would not become 
energy self-sufficient in a couple of years. 
In the second policy-paradigm, motivated by the “neorealist paradigm”, the political and geopolitical expe-
diencies behind the energy discussion were highlighted. The framing of “energy as a security issue”, the 
“challenges for gas companies” the “geopolitical chessboard”, and the historical “legacies of the conflict” 
were the main discourses set forth in this policy-paradigm. Both sides asserted that the energy debate has 
been hijacked by domestic expediencies. From the Greek-Cypriot viewpoint, the decision-making on the 
future monetization of the gas reserves should remain in their hands; the resulting profits, however, could be 
shared by both sides. The Turkish-Cypriots disagree with this rationale and claimed that the issue should be 
put on the negotiation table. The Greek-Cypriots are afraid that this might fuel the existing tensions and 
create a new problem in parallel with the Cyprus conflict one. They also fear that this would not remain a bi-
communal issue because the Turkish-Cypriots might act as “the Trojan Horse of Turkey”. The Greek-
Cypriot side, after the 1974 events and the feeling of abasement it suffered, holds negative reflexes vis-à-vis 
Turkey’s intentions on the Island. Furthermore, both sides agreed that the maritime disputes around the Is-
land are linked to the diachronic dispute between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean. Finally, the psycho-
milieu of resentment that surrounds the Island, explains why the energy dispute was viewed from the angle 
of the existing conflict. 
We will close our conclusions pointing to the difficulties inherent in such research enterprise. Both the Cy-
prus conflict and the energy security issue are so convoluted that multiple factors might not gain the atten-
tion they probably merit. Through the presentation of these policy paradigms the author sought to lay out 
which contradictory tendencies are at play. One of these tendencies is more likely to prevail under certain 
conditions than the other. But under which conditions one tendency would actually dominate cannot be ac-
curately predicted. Furthermore, experience has shown that international politics are exposed to continuous 
change, because world affairs conceal surprises in store for everyone attempting to “read the future from his 
knowledge of the past and from signs of the present” (Morgenthau, 1948: 7). For instance, we do not actual-
ly know whether and how a potential crisis between Turkey and the RoC or between Turkey and Greece 
might alter the power configuration in the area. The best an author could do in such a situation is to trace the 
different tendencies and the likelihoods attached to them. 
The most formidable challenge encountering a scientific inquiry into the nature and ways of international 
politics is the ambiguity of the material the analyst has to deal with. Since the author does not participate in 
the negotiations that take place between the two sides behind closed doors, he cannot set out which actual 
“truths” motivate the debate. Time pressure and “personal chemistry” between the negotiators are non-
verbal variables in the conclusion of a negotiation that cannot be easily put on paper.  
This assumption points to a vast difference between the academic and the policy world. Diplomacy and 
negotiations in every political debate are not only science but art as well: they constitute a “practice enacted 
in and on the world, in real time and with actual consequences for the practitioner” (Pouliot, 2010: 16). Sea-
soned diplomats are at pains to explain their craft in abstract terms, like commonsense  identified as the 
essence of diplomacy  intelligence and tact (ibid). These concepts cannot be taught in books or articles 
through the help of formal schemes since they do not crop up from conscious deliberations. The essence and 
practicality of diplomacy and negotiations cannot be fully captured by detached and representational obser-
vation (ibid). This does justice to the very difficulties researchers encounter while dealing with such sensi-
tive issues. 
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